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Given the key role of banks as financial intermediaries in the process of transforma-
tion from a plan to a market economy, empirical assessment of efficiency of banking
institutions in former socialist economies (FSE) has been given considerable at-
tention in the recent empirical literature. Table 4.1 provides a brief overview of
these studies, which share several common features. First, all of them are based on
the efficiency frontier methodology, according to which each bank’s performance is
benchmarked against a frontier reflecting the characteristics of the best-performing
banks in the sample.1 Most of the studies employ stochastic frontier analysis (SFA),
a parametric method that is less sensitive to the measurement errors in the sample,
relative to the alternative non-parametric method, the data envelopment analysis
1Coelli et al. (2005) contains a textbook exposition of the efficiency frontier methodology. Berger
and Mester (1997) and Hughes and Mester (2008) review applications of these methods in the
banking industry.
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(DEA). Next, efficiency analysis is conducted for two important measures of bank
performance: costs and profits. In both cases, the variables determining technology
of banks include the amount of outputs (such as loans, investments, other earning
assets) and the level of input prices (such as cost of capital, labor, financial funds).2
Finally, all studies assume that banks share a common production technology. In
other words, production capacity of all banks are described by an identical produc-
tion possibility frontier.
The aim of this chapter is to relax the latter restrictive assumption by allowing
for multiple technology regimes, conditional on differences in economic environments
in which banks operate. The main criticism of the homogenous technological regime
assumption adopted by all studies reviewed in Table 4.1 is the potential bias in the
frontier estimates and, thus, the obtained efficiency scores (Orea and Kumbhakar,
2004). Specifically, if the true technology is heterogenous, then the omitted techno-
logical differences might be inappropriately labeled as inefficiency in single-frontier
estimations. Consequently, the measures of the impact of inefficiency determinants
will be affected. Another drawback of the homogenous technological regime assump-
tion is that it imposes restrictions on certain important characteristics of banking
activity, such as technical progress and scale economies.
There are several approaches how one can deal with the impact of technologi-
cal differences. One approach is to include country-specific environmental variables
that are likely to influence technologies of banks, such as the level of economic de-
velopment and institutional background, as additional explanatory variables in the
frontier (Berger, 2007). In fact, most of the cross-country studies reviewed in Table
4.1 augment the frontier by country-specific variables (Fries and Taci, 2005, Bonin
2 In most studies, the theoretical foundation for the choice of frontier determinants is either the
intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) or the modified production approach (Berger
and Humphrey, 1991).
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et al., 2005, Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007, Poghosyan and Borovicka, 2007, Green
et al., 2007). The main disadvantage of this approach is that the introduction of
the environmental variables only affects the intercept of the frontier specification,
leaving the slope parameters unaffected (Bos and Schmiedel, 2007). Thus, although
more flexibility in intercepts may partially alleviate the bias in inefficiency estimates
(Valverde et al., 2007), the constancy of the slope parameters will still impose re-
strictions on technical progress and scale economies of banks. Another drawback of
this approach is that technological differences are assumed to be country-specific,
which rules out the possibility that banks located within the same country may
employ different business models.
An alternative approach to alleviate the impact of technological differences is
a priori sample restriction. The sample restriction can be based, for instance, on
the organizational structure of banks (Mester, 1993, Altunbas et al., 2001), or their
geographical location (Mester, 1996, Bos and Schmiedel, 2007). The main disadvan-
tage of this approach is that a priori restriction of sample groups is to some extent
arbitrary. For instance, Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) show that even banks having
similar organizational structure can operate under different technological regimes.
In this study, we account for differences in technological regimes using a latent
class stochastic frontier analysis (LCSFA), which addresses the disadvantages asso-
ciated with the aforementioned alternative approaches (Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004,
Greene, 2005).3 Unlike the first approach, the impact of the environmental factors is
not only reflected in the magnitude of the intercepts, but also affects the slope coef-
ficients. Here, the environmental variables enter as latent class determinants rather
than as a part of the frontier and thus influence both estimates of the technological
regime of banks and their efficiency simultaneously. Unlike the second approach, the
3To our best knowledge, this is the first application of the LCSFA for studying efficiency of banks
in FSE.
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latent class method does not require a priori grouping of banks. Instead, it utilizes
all information available in the sample and identifies separate technological regimes
based on the maximum likelihood principle.
Our estimations suggest that banks in FSE operate under three distinct techno-
logical regimes. Not only do we observe technological differences between new EU
member FSE countries and the rest, but also technological regimes differ within the
new EU members. Differences in technological regimes also have implications for
the impact of foreign bank participation on bank efficiency. In line with the find-
ings in Chapter 3, we show that foreign bank participation improves efficiency of
banks located in the new members of European Union, with a relatively high level
of economic development, while the impact of foreign ownership on banks in less
developed CIS countries is ambiguous.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents
the LCSFA model and estimation details. A data description is provided in section
3, while the estimation results are reviewed in section 4. The last section concludes.
4.2 Accounting for Heterogeneity of Banking Tech-
nologies: A Latent Class Stochastic Frontier
Model
In our LCSFA model, we assume that the technology is represented by a cost function
in the translog form. Following Orea and Kumbhakar (2004), the translog cost
function for class j may be written as:
lnCit = lnC(yit,wit, t; βk) + uit|k + vit|k, (4.1)
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where subscripts i = 1, ...,N, t = 1, ..., Ti, and k = 1, ...,K stand for bank, time,
and class, respectively; Cit is individual bank total cost; yit and wit indicate vectors
of outputs and input prices; and βk is a class-specific vector of parameters to be
estimated. The two-sided random error term vit|k is assumed to be independent of
the non-negative cost inefficiency variable uit|k for each class.
To estimate the model using maximum likelihood we assume that the random er-
ror term for class k (vit|k) follows a normal distribution with zero mean and constant
variance, σ2vk. In addition, the inefficiency term for class k (uit|k) is assumed to be a
product of a time-invariant individual bank effect, ui|k and a parametric function of
time and other explanatory variables (inefficiency determinants), λit. The ui|k term
is assumed to have a non-negative truncated normal distribution with zero mean
and variance, σ2uk.
Similarly to Orea and Kumbhakar (2004), we specify the inefficiency variable
uit|k in general form as:
uit|k = λit(ηk)ui|k = exp(z′itηk)ui|k, (4.2)
where ui|k ≥ 0; ηk = (η1k, ..., ηHk)′ is a H × 1 vector of parameters and zit =
(z1it, ..., zHit)′ is a H × 1 vector of inefficiency determinants, including the Battese
and Coelli (1992) trend specification: zit = (T − t), where T = max(Ti) is the final
time period in the panel.



























are parameters describing the technology of banks belonging to class k; Φ(.) and
φ(.) are standard normal cumulative and density functions, respectively. Following
Greene (2005), we assume that bank observations are independent over time, thus
the overall contribution of bank i to the conditional likelihood can be derived using





The unconditional likelihood of bank i is obtained as a weighted sum of the k-class
likelihood functions. The weights are the class membership probabilities reflecting
the uncertainty regarding the true membership in the sample. A convenient way to








where k = 1, ...,K denote classes; δK = 0 is a parameter normalization for the refer-
ence class and qi is a vector of bank-specific and time-invariant class determinants.











Pik = 1. Combining (4.3) and (4.4) results in an overall
likelihood function of parameters θ and δ:
















Notice that to identify the parameters of latent class probabilities, the sample has
to be generated from different technological regimes in which the banks are oper-
4 It is important to notice that the inefficiency term uit|k is a deterministic function of time, i.e.,
uit|k = λit(.)ui|k.
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ating. Hence, the number of classes K determined by the means of information
criteria should not exceed the number of true regimes in the sample, otherwise the
parameters cannot be identified.
Unlike the standard stochastic frontier approach, where the cost frontier is the
same for each bank, in the latent class stochastic frontier model we estimate several
frontiers equal to the number of classes. How can the inefficiency term be estimated
now that there are several benchmarks? One possibility is to assign class member-
ship for an individual bank based on the highest probability and, consequently, use
the stochastic frontier estimated for that class as a benchmark against which the
inefficiency can be computed. However, this approach imposes arbitrary class mem-
bership, while the posterior probabilities of class membership are far from certain.
An alternative approach, used by Greene (2005), is based on the weighted average





P(k|i) ln EFit(k), (4.7)
where P(k|i) is the posterior probability of class-k membership for bank i; and EFit(k)
is the bank’s efficiency using class-k technology as a reference. In this case, tech-
nologies from every class are taken into account in estimating the overall efficiency.
4.3 Data
We use bank-level data for various FSE, including both former Soviet republics and
Central and Eastern European countries, for the 1995-2005 period. The bank-level
data is extracted from financial reports (balance sheets and income statements)
available though the BankScope database of Bureau van Dĳk.5 The data set is
5To alleviate the impact of randomness in our estimation outcomes, we restrict the data set to
those banks which are present in the sample for 5 or more years in a row.
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complemented by historical ownership information collected from individual bank
web-pages and from the EBRD internal database.6 The resulting sample covers
information on banks from the following twenty countries: Albania (AL), Armenia
(AZ), Azerbaĳan (AZ), Bulgaria (BG), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BY), Czech Repub-
lic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Georgia (GE), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Kazakhstan
(KZ), Lithuania (LT), Latvia (LV), Moldova (MD), Poland (PL), Romania (RO),
Russia (RU), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), and Ukraine (UA).
The latent class stochastic frontier model described in the previous section re-
quires three sets of variables determining (i) the stochastic frontier (Cit,yit,t,wit), (ii)
the inefficiency term (zit), and (iii) the class membership (qit). For the stochastic
cost frontier, we follow the modified production approach (see Berger and Humphrey,
1991) and use two types of bank outputs: total loans (y1,it) and total deposits (y2,it).
The banks produce their services using two inputs, physical capital and labor. Ac-
cordingly, the price of the physical capital is measured as a ratio of non-interest
expenses to total assets (w1,it), while the price of labor is proxied by the ratio of to-
tal personnel expenses to total assets (w2,it).7 The dependent variable in the frontier
is the total cost of banks (cit), which includes both interest and operating expenses.
The inefficiency term is measured as a function of the following determinants
zit.8 The first determinant is the foreign ownership dummy variable (FOREIGN).
This variable takes a value of one if more than 50% of bank capital is owned by
foreigners. The coefficient of this variable enables testing the relative efficiency hy-
pothesis of banks depending on their ownership structure. The second determinant
6We thank Anita Taci from the EBRD for kindly sharing her data set.
7 In the absence of a reliable information on the number of bank employees, it has become cus-
tomary in the literature to proxy labor costs by deflating labor expenses over total assets (see, for
instance, Fries and Taci, 2005 or Rossi et al., 2004).
8The selection of inefficiency determinants assumes that these variables can be influenced by the
decision of bank managers. The environmental variables that are out of control of bank managers
are expected to influence the technology regimes of banks.
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is the interest rate margin (MARGIN), which we incorporate as a measure of mar-
ket power enjoyed by a particular bank. The coefficient of this variable explains
the relationship between market structure and bank efficiency. Finally, the third
determinant is the Battese and Coelli (1992) time trend variable (TIME). This
specification assumes that the inefficiency term is either increasing, or decreasing,
or staying constant over time.
To account for possible heterogeneity due to different production technologies
we employ four country-specific variables qit as latent class determinants: progress
in financial sector reforms proxied by the index of banking sector reforms (BSRF),
progress in market liberalization reforms proxied by the index of economic freedom
(FRDM), the level of GDP expressed in US dollars (GDP), and the interbank rate
(RATE).9 All these variables are not controlled by bank managers, but can po-
tentially influence the banking technology. They have been employed in previous
studies either as variables shifting the cost frontier, or influencing the inefficiency
term. The novelty of our approach is that, instead of imposing a structural relation
between these variables and the cost frontier, we test whether banking technology
varies across countries with different characteristics using the maximum likelihood
principle.
Descriptive statistics of variables employed in our estimations are displayed in
Table 4.2. The decomposition of statistics across different countries shows that there
is a great deal of variation in terms of total costs, outputs, and input prices. In most
cases, the new EU member countries are characterized by relatively higher costs
accompanied by larger outputs and input prices. These countries are also the lead-
9All variables are time invariant and measured as average values per country (see also equation
(4.4)). The index of economic freedom is measured on a yearly basis by the Heritage Foundation
and covers a wide range of economic areas, including business, trade, monetary and fiscal poli-
cies, property rights, corruption etc. More detailed information about the index is available at:
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/.
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ing performers in terms of banking sector reforms. Whether superior institutional
characteristics can influence banking technology is the question we investigate in the
next step.




































































lkt ln yit,l + vit|k + uit|k, (4.8)
where index k = 1, ...,K expresses class membership. The inefficiency term for each
class is measured using a fixed effects estimator (αik), while linear homogeneity
restrictions are satisfied by expressing all variables in terms of a ratio with respect
to one of the input prices (capital costs). Inefficiency is modeled as a function of its
determinants:
uit|k = exp[η1kFOREIGN + η2kMARGIN + η3k(T − t)]ui, (4.9)
where T is the last period in the sample. The latent class probabilities are specified
as:
Pik(δk) =




exp[δ0k + δ1kGDP+ δ2kBSRF+ δ3kNMS]
. (4.10)
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4.4 Estimation Results
4.4.1 Selection of the number of classes
In estimating equations (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10) one needs to evaluate the appropriate
number of classes K. A customary way of selecting the number of classes is to draw on
the information criteria. We have computed BIC (Schwartz’s criterion) statistic for
up to three classes.10 The statistic increases with number of classes, which suggests
that the preferred model is the one with three latent classes (see Table 4.3).11
To cross-check the class size selection from the inefficiency term point of view, we
estimate the model for one, two, and three classes and compare the average efficiency
scores for each of these models. As can be observed from Table 4.4, the average
efficiency monotonically increases with the number of classes. This relationship
implies that the country-specific heterogeneity in banking technologies, if not taken
into account, would lead to downward-biased efficiency score estimates.
The high posterior class probabilities (around 90% on average) reported in Table
4.3 suggest that the country-specific variables chosen as class determinants in our
estimations provide quite a precise group classification. Therefore, classification of
banks into three groups according to their maximum probabilities can be performed
with pretty high level of confidence.







, where K is the
number of latent classes, Π(K) is the number of parameters to estimate for specification with K
latent classes and Ti is the number of observations for bank i. The best model is the one with the
highest BIC statistic.
11Models with more than three latent classes are overspecified and could not be estimated using
the maximum likelihood methodology.
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4.4.2 Parameter estimates and analysis of class-specific effi-
ciency scores
Estimates of class-specific parameters are displayed in Table 4.5. In most cases, the
parameters representing the efficiency frontiers are significant at conventional confi-
dence levels. However, the individual coefficients do not have an economic meaning.
Instead, one has to estimate auxiliary measures based on the estimated frontier pa-
rameters to provide an economic interpretation of the estimation outcomes. The
first measure is technical progress, which in our case is assumed to be an exogenous
variable proxied as a function of time. The derivative of total costs with respect to
time (∂ lnC/∂t) calculated at sample means thus measures the change in banking
production technology following innovations not explained by outputs and income
prices. A negative sign for this measure implies technological progress (decrease
in bank costs over time). We find that banks in the second and third classes ex-
hibit technological progress, while the first class is characterized by a frontier with
increasing bank costs over time.
The second measure is the returns to scale estimated as one minus the sum of
elasticities of total costs with respect to outputs (RTS = 1−∑
k
∂ lnC/∂ ln yk). For
constant returns to scale technology, this measure should be equal to zero. A negative
measure implies that banks are operating at the decreasing returns to scale part of
the cost function. Our estimation results suggest that all three technological regimes
exhibit decreasing returns to scale technology, although with different degrees of
intensity.
Average cost efficiency estimates for different classes reported in Table 4.6 show
that the first class represents banks with the highest efficiency scores (80.3%), while
the second class represents the worst performing banks (72.8%). The majority of
banks, representing 46% of the sample, are characterized by an average efficiency
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level (73.3%) and clustered in the third class.
Estimates for the class determining variables reported in Table 4.5 imply that the
first class represents banks from small countries with relatively high interest rates
compared to the third class, while the second class represents banks from countries
with a high level of economic freedom and high interest rates.
4.4.3 Economic interpretation of heterogeneous technologies
The next step in our investigation is to search for a pattern between class-membership
of banks and their country of origin. We assign observations for each of the countries
under research to the three classes based on their maximum probabilities (see Table
4.7). As already mentioned before, the possible imprecision in doing this is low given
very large posterior class membership probabilities (about 90% on average).
The results suggest that five out of the eight new EU member countries are
assigned to the (average performing) third class, and the rest is classified to the
worst performing second class. Although these classes are not characterized by
high efficiency levels, they exhibit positive technological progress over time. This
result is remarkable, since it implies that banks in new EU member countries may
have benefited from spillover effects coming from core EU countries and enjoyed
technological progress. However, EU membership did not result in improvement of
the efficiency of the banking system as a whole.
On the contrary, banks from many former Soviet republics with a low level of
economic development are assigned to the best performing first class. Although
relatively more efficient, the first class is also the one that does not exhibit techno-
logical progress. Thus, our results suggest that there seems to be a tradeoff between
efficiency of the banking sector and technological progress in the banking industry.
The impact of inefficiency determinants also varies across classes. Foreign-owned
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banks are more efficient in countries assigned to the third class. However, this
variable is not significant in other classes. This finding should be interpreted with
care, since it might be biased due to sample selection (Berger, 2007, Poghosyan and
Borovicka, 2007).
Finally, banks with a higher interest margin (i.e., banks with more market power)
are more efficient than banks belonging to the third class. This finding indicates
efficiency-enhancing effect of consolidation of the banking sector in countries belong-
ing to this class. Market structure is not a significant determinant of inefficiency in
other classes.
4.5 Conclusions
This study provides evidence on the heterogeneity of technology regimes in FSE
banking. Using a novel LCSFA methodology, we show that environmental variables,
such as the level of economic development, progress in economic reforms, and institu-
tional background, have an important influence on the technology regime employed
by banks. Our analysis suggests that single-frontier methods employed in previous
studies, which do not account for technological differences, result in an upward-bias
of inefficiency estimates, since technological differences are mistakenly attributed to
inefficiency.
We identify three distinct technology regimes, characterized by different levels of
technological progress and scale economies. Further analysis of the results reveals
the existence of a tradeoff between bank efficiency and technological progress. Banks
in the new EU member countries exhibit a higher degree of technological progress,
but lower efficiency levels, while former Soviet republics are largely characterized by
efficient banking systems that do not show technological progress over time.
We also find that differences in technology regimes have implications for the
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impact of foreign ownership on bank efficiency. In line with the results reported in
Chapter 3, we find that foreign ownership has a positive impact on bank efficiency
in FSE with a relatively higher level of economic development, such as some of the
new EU members. On the contrary, foreign ownership does not have a significant
influence on bank efficiency in most CIS countries, which are still lagging behind in
terms of economic reform.
Overall, our results signify the importance of accounting for differences in tech-
nology regimes when analyzing bank efficiency in FSE. A failure to account for tech-
nological differences may lead to erroneous conclusions regarding various aspects of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3. Selection of the number of classes
Number of Number of Log- BIC Posterior class
classes parameters likelihood probability
1 21 -355.1 -866.3 0.880
2 43 -50.4 -420.5 0.933
3 65 109.0 -265.3 0.884
Notes: the table features SFA estimations for 1, 2, and 3 latent classes using 2,058 observations for the







, where K is the
number of latent classes, Π(K) is the number of parameters to estimate for specification with K latent
classes and Ti is the number of observations for bank i (the best model is the one with the highest BIC
statistic). The posterior class probability reflects the degree of precision with which banks were classified
to classes (higher probability implies higher precision).
Table 4.4. Average efficiency scores for LCM with different number of classes
Year SFA model with SFA model with SFA model with
3 latent classes 2 latent classes 1 latent class
1995 0.763 0.720 0.614
1996 0.743 0.720 0.694
1997 0.732 0.720 0.690
1998 0.742 0.720 0.694
1999 0.749 0.725 0.702
2000 0.747 0.720 0.708
2001 0.757 0.730 0.725
2002 0.755 0.730 0.730
2003 0.754 0.728 0.734
2004 0.750 0.726 0.737
Total 0.750 0.726 0.718
Notes: the table features average efficiency scores obtained for SFA models with 1, 2, and 3 latent classes
using 2,058 observations for the period 1995-2005.
Heterogeneity of Technological Regimes and Bank Efficiency 77
Table 4.5. LCM estimation results
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
Intercept -1.4675 -1.6590 3.6120 1.4230 6.0129 8.1120
Total loans -0.4614 -1.4420 -0.5235 -1.7140 -0.3826 -2.3950
Total deposits 1.3361 4.4810 1.6195 5.6780 1.2858 8.3210
Price of labor/Price of capital 0.3220 1.3430 -0.7347 -1.0480 -2.0698 -9.1420
Trend 0.2079 2.6980 -0.3123 -2.0310 -0.1247 -2.7020
(Total loans)2 -0.0115 -0.8030 0.1523 7.5240 0.2118 15.4680
(Total loans)*(Total deposits) -0.0337 -2.0630 -0.1160 -4.3260 -0.2417 -19.6840
(Total loans)*(Price of labor/Price
of capital)
0.1033 2.0350 0.0860 1.5640 0.1606 6.2750
(Total loans)*Trend 0.0041 0.4070 0.0404 3.0700 0.0098 1.7280
(Total deposits)2 0.1616 7.0920 0.0787 1.8540 0.3213 23.0500
(Total deposits)*(Price of la-
bor/Price of capital)
-0.1360 -2.9180 -0.1113 -2.0450 -0.1705 -6.8540
(Total deposits)*Trend -0.0163 -1.7040 -0.0371 -2.4780 -0.0277 -5.4910
(Price of labor/Price of capital)2 0.1186 3.7120 0.2123 2.1090 0.4608 12.4120
(Price of labor/Price of capi-
tal)*Trend
-0.0334 -2.8140 0.0364 1.8890 0.0409 5.7570
(Trend)2 0.0010 0.2080 0.0013 0.1490 -0.0028 -1.2340
Sigma 0.8206 3.0070 0.9741 32.7780 0.9211 27.1560
Lambda 0.1586 0.1130 3.3844 0.0020 0.1963 0.1140
Inefficiency determinants
Intercept -0.0706 -0.1050 -2.8224 -0.1510 0.2336 1.1020
Foreign ownership 0.1489 0.4560 -1.7880 -0.3040 -0.2696 1.7410
Interest margin -0.0603 -0.6940 -0.7098 -0.2390 -0.0495 -2.1370
Trend 0.1349 6.3160 -0.0312 -1.6510 -0.0054 -0.6450
Class probability determinants
Intercept 0.2983 0.1210 -9.1528 -3.3340 – –
Banking sector reforms 0.6579 0.8930 0.1371 0.1980 – –
Index of economic freedom -0.3230 -0.3920 1.4317 1.9390 – –
GDP (in USD) -0.3423 -2.4300 0.1847 1.0830 – –
Interbank rate 0.1243 2.6310 0.1393 2.9160 – –
Auxiliary measures at data means
Technological progress 0.02 -0.32 -0.04
Returns to scale -1.53 -0.27 -2.66
Prior class probabilities at data means
0.30 0.24 0.46
Notes: 2,053 observations for the 1995-2005 period. Dependent variable is ln Citwit,1 .
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Table 4.6. Comparison of efficiency scores
Year Class-1 Class-2 Class-3 Average
1995 0.9512 0.7631 0.6691 0.7631
1996 0.8767 0.7941 0.6555 0.7429
1997 0.8429 0.6929 0.7092 0.7318
1998 0.8451 0.6805 0.7249 0.7420
1999 0.8353 0.7194 0.7201 0.7490
2000 0.8210 0.7107 0.7206 0.7471
2001 0.8096 0.7377 0.7393 0.7572
2002 0.7907 0.7365 0.7437 0.7548
2003 0.7760 0.7504 0.7435 0.7538
2004 0.7531 0.7498 0.7487 0.7502
Total 0.8029 0.7281 0.7331 0.7499
Notes: the table features average efficiency scores obtained for the SFA model 3 latent classes using
2,058 observations for the period 1995-2005. The classification of banks by classes is performed using the
maximum probability principle (e.g., the bank is assigned to class 1 if the probability of being in class 1 is
higher than probabilities obtained for classes 2 and 3).
Table 4.7. Assigning class membership
Number of obs. Frequency





AL 14 24 38 37% 63% 3
AM 26 8 8 42 62% 19% 19% 1
AZ 51 5 56 91% 9% 1
BG 4 4 100% 3
BY 22 17 39 56% 44% 1
CZ 4 84 81 169 2% 50% 48% 2 YES
EE 23 23 100% 3 YES
GE 21 21 42 50% 50% 1/3
HR 24 14 185 223 11% 6% 83% 3
HU 30 41 31 102 29% 40% 30% 2 YES
KZ 17 11 67 95 18% 12% 71% 3
LT 4 55 59 7% 93% 3 YES
LV 23 14 67 104 22% 13% 64% 3 YES
MD 33 24 57 58% 42% 1
PL 39 62 121 222 18% 28% 55% 3 YES
RO 63 59 122 52% 48% 1
RU 41 102 147 290 14% 35% 51% 3
SI 29 4 75 108 27% 4% 69% 3 YES
SK 12 48 36 96 13% 50% 38% 2 YES
UA 79 39 44 162 49% 24% 27% 1
Notes: AL - Albania, AM - Armenia, AZ - Azerbaĳan, BG - Bulgaria, BY - Bosnia and Herzegovina,
CZ - Czech Republic, EE - Estonia, GE - Georgia, HR - Croatia, HU - Hungary, KZ - Kazakhstan, LT
- Lithuania, LV - Latvia, MD - Moldova, PL - Poland, RO - Romania, RU - Russia, SI - Slovenia, SK -
Slovakia, UA - Ukraine.
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to the system approach used in Shaffer (1989). For this purpose, these studies assume
that the marginal cost (CLi) in equation (5.7) is a linear function of bank output
(Li) and input prices (w). This assumption, however, is not innocuous. It disregards
the cost efficiency of banks, which was found to be an important determinant of net
interest margins in several recent studies (see, for instance, Maudos and Fernandez de
Guevara, 2004). More efficient banks have the opportunity to operate with a lower
margin due to the gains from the less expensive conduct of intermediation activities.
Therefore, the analysis in this paper improves upon previous work by explicitly
taking cost efficiency of banks into account when evaluating their marginal costs.
The next subsection provides the details of our empirical approach.
5.2.2 Empirical methodology
The empirical assessment of the market power possessed by domestic and foreign
banks in at least one of the markets (loan or deposit) is based on the estimation of
the equation (5.7), which can be represented in terms of a linear model:




Dit ∗ DGF) + β3(r˜dDit ∗ DA) + β4CLit , (5.8)
where indices i and t denote bank and time, respectively, rLit is the implicit loan
rate, r˜dDit =
rdDit
1−ρi is the implicit deposit rate adjusted for the impact of financial
taxation,11 DGF and DA are dummy variables for foreign greenfield and acquired
banks, and CLit is the marginal cost of producing an extra unit of output for bank i
at time t. Abstracting from interaction terms, a value of coefficient β1 significantly
larger than one would indicate the presence of market power in at least one of the
11The level of financial taxation ρi is an approximate measure, which serves only as a guideline
for banks in their intermediation activities. In reality, banks often hold excess reserves in their
accounts at the central bank for liquidity reasons. In addition, banks borrow money from the
central bank in case their reserves are not sufficient to fulfill the reserve requirements set up by the
regulators. In the empirical estimations, we use country-specific reserve requirements information
from the international survey on banking regulation available in Barth et al. (2008).
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markets (loans or deposits) for the whole banking industry, including both domestic
and foreign banks. Introduction of the interaction terms allows to identify whether
the extent of market power differs between domestic and foreign banks. For instance,
a significantly negative (positive) coefficient β2 would suggest that market power of
foreign greenfield banks is lower (higher) than market power of domestic banks. The
magnitude and sign of the coefficient β3 can be interpreted in a similar way.
To carry out an estimation of equation (5.8), one needs to introduce a measure
of marginal costs. Instead of pursuing the strategy of Barajas et al. (1999) and Vera
et al. (2007) and proxying the linear relationship between marginal costs and their
underlying factors in an ad hoc way, the marginal costs are obtained directly from
the data using the stochastic efficiency frontier methodology.12 The advantage of
this approach is that it explicitly takes the impact of the cost efficiency of banks on
the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output into account. By includ-
ing the inefficiency-free measure of marginal costs, we also control for the possible
relationship between market power of banks and their efficiency.13 In addition, using
information on the timing of cross-border bank acquisitions, we are able to evaluate
whether domestic banks taken over by foreigners improve their operational efficiency
after the acquisition or not.
Consistent with the intermediation model described above, let us assume that
banks produce one unit of output (L) using labor, capital and borrowed funds as
inputs. Let w1, w2 and w3 denote the prices of labor, capital and borrowed funds.
To capture the technological progress experienced by banks in CEECs during the
12A comprehensive textbook exposition of the stochastic efficiency frontier methodology can be
found in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Coelli et al. (2005).
13Efficiency of banks can affect their pricing strategy. For example, more cost efficient banks incur
lower marginal costs and can set lower prices compared to the less cost efficient banks. Application
of the inefficiency-free measure of marginal costs makes it possible to compare the market power
parameters (measured as a relative wedge between prices and marginal costs) across banks with
different efficiency levels.
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last decade,14 a time trend (Trend) is introduced among the determinants of the cost
frontier. In line with previous cross-country studies, we also control for possible shifts
in the cost frontiers across countries due to differences in macroeconomic conditions
and institutional backgrounds by introducing country-specific (Cn) and time-specific
(Tm) dummy variables. The final translog specification of the cost function for the



















































































φmTm + uit + vit, (5.9)
where αi0 captures individual bank random effects, vit ∼ N(0, σ2v ) is the i.i.d. error
term and uit = Btui is the positive inefficiency term varying across banks and over
time, which is composed of two parts: a non-stochastic positive time component,
Bt > 0, that is time-varying but the same for all banks and a stochastic individual
component, ui ∼ N+(µ, σ2u), which follows a truncated normal distribution with a
conditional mean parameter µ. The inefficiency term can be expressed in a general
form as:
uit = exp(η′Zit)ui, (5.10)
where Zit is a vector of factors affecting bank efficiency and η is a vector of parame-
14See Fries and Taci (2005), Bonin et al. (2005) and Poghosyan and Borovicka (2007) for the recent
empirical evidence of the impact of technological progress in transition banking.
15This formulation takes into account the adding-up and symmetry restrictions imposed by theory.
In addition, the linear homogeneity restriction is satisfied by deflating costs and the second input
price by the first input price.
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ters. We use several determinants of bank efficiency. First, the efficiency is modeled
as a function of time using the specification of Kumbhakar and Wang (2005): (t− t),
where t is the beginning of the sample. A significant positive (negative) parameter
estimate of this variable would indicate that over the whole sample period, effi-
ciency of banks in CEECs has deteriorated (improved). Since the sample period
was marked by increased foreign bank participation, the coefficient of this variable
can be interpreted in terms of the overall impact of foreign bank participation on
bank efficiency in CEECs. Next, in order to discern the differences in cost effi-
ciency across domestic and foreign banks, we introduce dummy variables for foreign
greenfield (DGF) and foreign acquired banks (DA) into the inefficiency specification
(5.10). A significant positive (negative) coefficient of these dummy variables would
indicate that the post-entry efficiency of the corresponding foreign-owned banks is
on average lower (higher), in comparison to their peers. Finally, in a separate set of
estimations, we introduce current and lagged dummy variables for the year when the
domestic bank was taken over in order to evaluate the dynamic effect of cross-border
bank acquisitions on the banks’ performance.
Using results from the stochastic frontier model, the estimate of the marginal

























The marginal cost term CˆLit is adjusted for the influence of bank inefficiency and
can enter as an explanatory variable in equation (5.8). Using the generated regressor
CˆLit on the right hand side of (5.8) will influence the efficiency of the coefficient esti-
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mates due to the biased standard errors (see Pagan, 1984). Therefore, the standard
errors of the coefficient estimates are bootstrapped using 2000 replications to ensure
the robustness of our results.16
5.3 Data Description
The main source for the bank-specific information is the BankScope database of
Bureau Van Dĳk, from which the information on individual banks operating in 11
CEECs (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) is retrieved for the 1992-2006 period.
The data set contains information on balance sheets and income statements of 364
commercial, cooperative and savings banks.17 Unfortunately, BankScope does not
provide historical information on bank ownership, which is crucial for our analysis.
Therefore, we utilize the information on foreign-owned banks for the years 1992-
2004 from the extended data set of De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) employed in
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2008).18 This data set categorizes foreign-owned banks into
two groups: greenfield establishments and banks taken over as a result of a cross-
border acquisition. For the remaining two years, we update the missing foreign
ownership information using a list of cross-border bank acquisitions from Securities
Data Company (SDC) mergers and acquisitions database produced by Thompson
Financial. From this source, data on completed (effective) cross-border acquisitions
are extracted (i.e. parents of bidder and target banks have different countries of
origin), which involve target banks from CEECs and that result in the control of
ownership by the bidder bank exceeding 50% of the total equity outstanding.
Table 5.1 displays the evolution of foreign bank entry into CEECs. The dominant
16The number of bootstrap replications is chosen based on the optimal criteria suggested by An-
drews and Buchinsky (2000).
17We use unconsolidated statements of banks, replacing them by consolidated statements whenever
information on unconsolidated statements is not available.
18We thank Emilia Jurzyk and Iman Van Lelyveld for kindly sharing their data on bank ownership.
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mode of foreign entry in the initial stage of transition has been the establishment of
greenfield subsidiaries. The number of greenfield banks has grown rapidly by the mid
1990’s, remaining at comparable level afterwards. Cross-border acquisitions became
a popular mode of entry after the mid 1990’s, growing at an accelerating pace with
EU enlargement. In the last year of the sample, the share of total banking system
assets controlled by foreign banks amounted to 65.3%.19 Decomposition of this
share by the entry modes reveals that 15.1% of banking system assets is controlled
by greenfield banks, while the remaining 50.2% is under control of foreign acquired
banks.
Table 5.2 lists and describes the variables used and their sources. Before proceed-
ing with the empirical analysis, observations with missing information in at least one
of the variables listed in Table 5.2 are dropped. Furthermore, to tackle the influence
of extreme observations and reporting errors, all variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles.
Descriptive statistics of the resulting data set are reported in Table 5.3. The
Table shows that foreign greenfield banks have lower scale of operations and incur
lower costs in comparison to the foreign acquired and domestic banks. This is due
to the fact that the main mission of greenfield banks is to serve their clients abroad,
rather than to engage into full scale operational activities in CEECs. There is also
high variation in terms of loan rates: domestic and foreign greenfield banks charge
on average more for their loans that foreign acquired banks. However, the variation
of deposit rates across banks is relatively modest. This observation can be explained
by the fact that depositors find it easier to switch banks when discrepancy in deposit
rates is high, while lending rates are to a large extent influenced by relationships of
19Difference between the share of total assets controlled by foreign-owned banks in the sample and
the EBRD information reported in Figure 5.5 is due to the fact that BankScope does not cover
all banks in the economy. In addition, our estimates refer to commercial, cooperative and savings
banks only, while the EBRD data covers all banks in the country.
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banks with their clients (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Domestic and foreign banks also
differ in terms of the riskiness of their loan portfolios: domestic and foreign acquired
banks have higher loan-loss provision reserves relative to the foreign greenfield banks.
To sum up, the preliminary analysis of the descriptive statistics highlights ap-
parent differences between domestic, foreign greenfield, and foreign acquired banks
in terms of the scale of their operations, incurred costs, and riskiness. These differ-
ences may be related to different missions and strategies employed by these banks,
reflected in their portfolio mix. However, the simple comparison made using sum-
mary statistics lacks theoretical argumentation and does not allow drawing firm
conclusions regarding foreign bank entry effects on efficiency and market power. In
the remainder of the paper, these issues are addressed using a more formal frame-
work.
5.4 Estimation Results
5.4.1 Foreign bank entry and cost efficiency
The empirical approach for evaluating the impact of foreign entry on bank efficiency
is based on the stochastic efficiency frontier methodology (SFA). We follow the inter-
mediation approach widely used in the banking literature (Sealey and Lindley, 1977)
and assume that banks are minimizing their costs given the optimal amount of earn-
ing assets to be generated, prices for inputs (labor, capital and financial resources)
and technological constraints. Bank costs (C) are measured as the total operating
expenses incurred by banks. Bank output (L) is proxied by the total earning assets
in the bank’s portfolio.20 Following the literature on bank efficiency, labor prices are
20 In a separate set of estimations, we subdivided bank output into two categories: total loans and
total security holdings. We also did estimations using only total loans as an output. In both cases,
the estimation results yielded qualitatively similar outcomes and are available upon request. The
possible reason for the similar outcomes is the dominating share of total loans in total earning assets
(about 90%) due to underdeveloped securities market in CEECs. Therefore, in the remainder of
the text we refer to the total earning assets as bank output L and use terms total earning assets
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measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (w1), capital prices as
the ratio of administrative expenses (other than personnel expenses) to total assets
(w2) and prices of borrowed funds as the ratio of interest expenses to a sum of total
deposits and other funding (w3). We control for the possible influence of environ-
mental differences across countries (e.g., macroeconomic developments, institutional
background) and over time (e.g., shocks common to all CEECs), by using country
and time dummies.
The outcomes of the SFA model estimations are summarized in Table 5.4. The
main focus of this analysis is the determinants of cost inefficiency, shown in the
middle panel of the Table. Let us start by introducing time trend as inefficiency
determinant in the specification (I). The negative significant coefficient of the trend
variable suggests that efficiency of banks in CEECs has on average improved over
time, which is in line with the evidence provided by Rossi et al. (2004). Increased
foreign bank participation has possibly influenced this general efficiency improve-
ment directly (through the higher efficiency of foreign banks) or indirectly (through
the increased competition due to foreign entry and knowledge spillovers).21
In order to evaluate the direct impact of foreign bank participation, in specifi-
cations (II) and (III) dummy variables for foreign greenfield and foreign acquired
banks are introduced. The estimation results suggest that foreign greenfield banks
have higher efficiency than domestic and foreign acquired banks. Introducing both
dummy variables simultaneously as inefficiency determinants in the specification
(IV) does not alter this result. This finding has important policy implications: it
highlights the importance of the entry mode on the performance of foreign banks. It
and total loans interchangeably.
21 In a separate set of regressions, we replaced the time trend by the yearly series on the market
share of foreign bank assets from EBRD (2007). In these estimations (available upon request), a
significant negative coefficient of the foreign market share variable was obtained, suggesting that
the efficiency improvement is correlated with the increased foreign bank participation.
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also suggests that the primary motivation behind foreign entry affects the post-entry
performance of banks. While foreign greenfield banks are mainly established with
the purpose to serve the clients of their parent banks, the entry via cross-border ac-
quisitions is primarily motivated by the efficiency improvements and market power
considerations (Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2007). As argued by Detragiache et al.
(2008), bank costs after the takeover can increase due to additional expenses related
to the need to increase the quality of monitoring activities.22 In order to capture
this dynamic effect, in specifications (V) - (VIII) current and lagged dummy vari-
ables for the year when the bank was taken over are introduced.23 We find two
offsetting effects on the efficiency following the foreign acquisition: the immediate
impact is significantly positive (deterioration of bank efficiency), while the one pe-
riod lagged impact is significantly negative (improvement of bank efficiency). These
two offsetting effects together with the fact that efficiency gains disappear in the
second period, as shown in the specifications (VII) and (VIII), might explain the
insignificant overall impact of the acquisition dummy variable in the specifications
(III) and (IV).
These findings are also in line with various case studies on foreign bank acquisi-
tions in CEECs. For instance, Abarbanell and Bonin (1997) discuss the impact of
privatization of the Polish Bank Slaski (BSK) to a foreign investor in the 1990s. The
authors find that the privatization of the bank by foreign investors did not lead to
an immediate improvement of its managerial performance. One explanation is that
the top management who ran the bank prior to the privatization did not change
22Another explanation for the insignificant relationship between the bank acquisition and its subse-
quent efficiency improvement might be the additional costs incurred in the process of reorganization
and restructuring, which most of the banks undergo following the takeover. Still another possibility
might be that target banks introduce new services, which requires installation of new equipment
and facilities causing an upsurge of costs in the short-run.
23This dummy variable captures 64 cross-border bank acquisition events. The number of feasible
observations for cross-border acquisitions decreases to 53 (44) when the impact of the takeover is
evaluated with a one period (two periods) time lag.
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following the privatization, due to the “...strength of personality, political influence,
and superior knowledge of banking...” (Abarbanell and Bonin, 1997, p. 46). Simi-
lar evidence has been documented in a case study on privatization of the Russian
Zhilsotsbank (Abarbanell and Meyendorff, 1997). However, the authors caution that
the results of privatization should not be judged only on the basis of the short-run
financial performance and that a “...critical lesson to be learned from the privatiza-
tion of BSK is the importance of a foreign financial investor taking an active role in
the development of bank strategy to bring about the fundamental changes necessary
to realize the potential franchise value.” (Abarbanell and Bonin, 1997, p. 57).
To sum up, we find that the mode of foreign entry has different implications for
bank efficiency. Foreign greenfield banks outperform domestic banks in terms of cost
efficiency, while the efficiency of foreign acquired banks is not significantly different
from that of domestic banks. The later result can be explained by offsetting effects
on efficiency following the foreign acquisition.
5.4.2 Foreign bank entry and market power
In order to evaluate the market power of banks, the following variables are used in
model (5.8): the implicit lending rate (rLit) is defined as the ratio of total interest
income to total loans, and the implicit deposit rate (rDit) is proxied by the ratio
of total interest expenses to total deposits. The deposit rates are adjusted by the
corresponding reserve requirement ratios in each of the CEECs (see Table 5.2). To
evaluate the impact of foreign ownership on market power of banks, interaction
terms of the average deposit rate with a foreign greenfield bank dummy (rDit ∗DGF)
and with a foreign greenfield bank dummy (rDit ∗DA) are introduced. Together with
the marginal cost estimates (MˆC) obtained from the SFA specification (IV) in Table
5.4, these variables can be used for conducting the market power test using model
(5.8).
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Table 5.5 shows the estimation results of (the augmented) equation (5.8). We ac-
count for heterogeneity across banks located in different CEECs with varying levels
of economic development and regulatory structures by applying a panel data estima-
tion technique. All estimations are done by fixed-effects method, which was found
to outperform the random-effects method based on the Hausman test. Standard
errors are estimated using residuals clustered by countries, to relax the assumption
of cross-sectional independence. Panel test for serial correlation based on the pro-
cedure of Drukker (2003) suggests that residuals in all specifications are free from
first order autocorrelation effects.
Specification (I) describes the baseline model. The coefficient of the deposit rate
variable is significant and larger than one. The Wald test indicates that the market
power coefficient is significantly larger than one, suggesting rejection of the com-
petitive market structure hypothesis for CEECs banking sector as a whole. This
finding applies to all banks in CEECs, regardless of their ownership. To evaluate
the impact of bank ownership on market power, the corresponding interaction terms
are included in specifications (II) and (III). The coefficients of interaction terms sug-
gest that foreign acquired banks have a significantly lower market power compared
to domestic and foreign greenfield banks. This finding does not alter when both
interaction terms are added to the model simultaneously in the specification (IV).
The Wald test suggests that market power coefficient of foreign acquired banks is
not significantly different from one, supporting the competitive market structure hy-
pothesis for these banks. This result contrasts the prediction of the Claeys and Hainz
(2007) model, in which competition in the domestic banking markets is stronger for
the greenfield entry, compared to the acquisition entry.24 Our results suggest that
24Claeys and Hainz (2007) do not consider the follow clients abroad motive for foreign bank entry
in their model, which might explain this contradictory result.
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cross-border bank acquisitions result in a more competitive banking environment,
which has important policy implications.
Robustness check
There are several important aspects of banking that are not captured in the theo-
retical model of market power. The first is the presence of uncertainty and credit
risk. To control for the impact of risk, we follow Barajas et al. (1999) and Vera et al.
(2007) and introduce the share of loan-loss provisions in total loans as a proxy of
quality of bank loan portfolio.25 The second aspect is the presence of non-interest
banking services, which might be considered as additional revenue for banks and
might influence their degree of riskiness and market power (Lepetit et al., 2008). To
control for the impact of fee-generating activities of banks, we follow Maudos and
Fernandez de Guevara (2004) and augment our specification by introducing the ratio
of non-interest revenues to total assets as a proxy for implicit interest revenues of
banks. Finally, macroeconomic fundamentals might influence the depth of financial
intermediation in the country (Cotarelli et al., 2005) and decision of banks to go
abroad. We control for the macroeconomic environment by introducing real GDP
growth, inflation and exchange rate changes in our specification.
The introduction of additional variables to control for banking risks (LLP), ser-
vice incomes (IMPL) and macroeconomic environment (GDP, INFL and FX) in
specifications (V), (VI), and (VII) does not change the main results. In particu-
lar, the coefficient of the interaction term with foreign greenfield dummy remains
insignificant, implying that even after accounting for credit risks, non-interest bank-
ing activities and macroeconomic variables, greenfield banks do not exhibit lower
25A more direct measure of loan portfolio quality would be the share of non-performing loans in
total loans. However, BankScope is missing information on non-performing loans for more than
half of banks in the sample, for which reason we rely on loan-loss provisions as an indicator of loan
portfolio quality.
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market power than domestic banks. This insignificant decrease in market power
can be explained by the absence of alternative sources of bank financing for the
customers of greenfield banks, who already established relationships with their long-
term partner banks.
In line with the theoretical prediction, banks with riskier loan portfolios and
higher share of non-interest banking activities charge higher lending rates.26 The
later result supports the findings of Lepetit et al. (2008), according to which banks
expanding to non-interest income activities are riskier than banks focused on lending,
which is reflected in higher loan rates. Among macroeconomic variables, we find
positive and significant effect of exchange rate depreciation on loan rates, which
suggests that currency stability has important implications for lending decisions of
banks.
To sum up, the estimation results reject the competitive market structure hy-
pothesis in CEECs, as the estimated market power coefficients are significantly larger
than one. This indicates that banks in CEECs possess market power at least in one
of the markets (loans or deposits).27 The market power of foreign acquired banks
is significantly lower than that of domestic and foreign greenfield banks, suggesting
that increase in competition as a result of the foreign entry is mainly driven by
cross-border acquisitions.
26Since interest income of banks can be affected by the quality of loan portfolio, using LLP among
explanatory variables may introduce endogeneity bias in coefficient estimates. To control for pos-
sible endogeneity, in a separate set of regressions we use lagged LLP among explanatory variables.
The estimation results are qualitatively similar to the specification with contemporaneous LLP and
are available upon request.
27Since the deposit market is likely to be more competitive than the loan market due to the negli-
gible bank switching costs for depositors and prevalence of relationship-based lending, we suggest
that the main part of the market power comes from the loan markets. Relatively lower variation
of deposit rates relative to the loan rates in our sample lends support for this argumentation (see
also discussion in Section 5.3).
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5.5 Conclusions
This paper has studied the implications of the recent sharp increase in foreign bank
participation in CEECs for the post-entry banking performance. The study has
highlighted the existence of a complex relationship between different modes of foreign
bank entry and both cost efficiency and market power of banks.
Foreign greenfield banks exhibit superior operational efficiency in comparison to
domestic and foreign acquired banks. This can be explained by the specialization
of greenfield banks to serve customers of their parent banks abroad and already
established banking relationships. The performance of foreign acquired banks ex-
hibits an offsetting dynamic pattern: the efficiency deteriorates in the initial year
of acquisition, slightly improving in the subsequent year. The overall impact on the
post-acquisition performance evaluated for the whole sample is insignificant, which
can be due to the poor managerial and financial characteristics of target banks in
CEECs inherited by foreign investors.
We also find evidence on differences in market power across domestic and foreign
banks. Market power of foreign greenfield banks is not significantly lower than that
of domestic banks. This result holds when the impact of credit risks, non-interest
banking activities and macroeconomic environment are taken into account, contrast-
ing the evidence from studies, which do not control for the cost efficiency of banks
when analyzing market power. Unlike greenfield entrants, foreign acquired banks ex-
hibit a substantially lower degree of market power, which can be explained by their
strategic considerations to expand activities in CEECs and subsequent increase of
the competitive pressure.
The analysis conducted in this study provides important policy implications. It
documents a significant improvement of banking performance in CEECs measured
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by cost efficiency during the sample period corresponding to an increase in foreign
bank participation. CEECs banks and customers have benefited from foreign partic-
ipation both directly (superior post-entry performance of greenfield banks) and indi-
rectly (overall increase in bank efficiency due to spillover effects to domestic banks).
Opening the borders for foreign entry has also contributed to the competitiveness
of the banking industry in CEECs, but largely due to cross-border acquisitions. In
this sense, the findings in this study provide support for the conventional belief by
the policymakers that liberalization of domestic banking industry and promotion of
foreign entry would have a positive impact.
However, these conclusions should be interpreted with caution, since this study
has not addressed the issue of financial stability in CEECs. During the recent
financial crisis, banking sectors in CEECs have proven to be very vulnerable to
systemic external shocks. The impact of the increased foreign bank participation on
financial stability is an important topic, which requires the attention of policymakers
and needs to be addressed in the future research.
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Figure 5.1. Share of foreign-owned banks in terms of total assets (%), 1995 and 2006
Source: EBRD (2007).




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.2. Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Measure Source
C Bank costs Total operating expenses BankScope
L Earning assets Total earning assets BankScope
w1 Price of labor Ratio of personnel expenses to
total assets
BankScope
w2 Price of capital Ratio of administrative expenses
(other than personnel expenses)
to total assets
BankScope
w3 Price of borrowed funds Ratio of interest expenses to a
sum of total deposits and other
funding
BankScope
DGF Foreign greenfield Dummy variable that takes value
of 1 for greenfield establishments
of foreign banks
De Haas and Van Lelyveld
(2006), Havrylchyk and Jurzyk
(2008)
DA Foreign acquired Dummy variable that takes value
of 1 for domestic banks acquired
by a foreign bank
De Haas and Van Lelyveld
(2006), Havrylchyk and Jurzyk
(2008), and Thomson’s SDC
Platinum Database
DFE Foreign entry Dummy variable that takes value
of 1 in the year when a domestic
bank was taken over by a foreign
bank
De Haas and Van Lelyveld
(2006), Havrylchyk and Jurzyk
(2008), and Thomson’s SDC
Platinum Database
rL Implicit loan rate Ratio of interest expenses to to-
tal loans
BankScope
rD Implicit deposit rate Ratio of interest expenses to to-
tal deposits
BankScope
MC Marginal costs Derivative of the cost func-
tion obtained from the stochas-
tic frontier model with respect to
output quantity
BankScope and own estimations
LLP Loan-loss provisions Ratio of loan-loss provisions to
total loans
BankScope
IMPL Implicit interest revenue Ratio of the net non-interest rev-
enues to total assets
BankScope
ρ Reserve requirements ratio (%) Bulgaria=8, the Czech Republic
= 2, Estonia = 16, Croatia =
19, Hungary = 5, Latvia = 8,
Lithuania = 6, Poland = 3.5, Ro-
mania = 20, Slovakia = 2, Slove-
nia = 2.
Barth et al. (2008)
GDP Economic activity Annual real GDP growth World Development Indicators
(WorldBank)




FX Currency stability Annual growth of average ex-
change rate vis-a-vis US dollar
International Financial Statistics
(IMF)





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the absence of developed bond and stock markets, banks continue to play a major
role as financial intermediaries in former socialist economies (FSEs) (Berglof and
Bolton, 2002; Bonin et al., 1998; Bonin and Wachtel, 2003). As a result, the costs
of financial intermediation services offered by banks remain crucial for the economic
development of FSEs. The observed massive increase of foreign bank participation
during the last decade inevitably raises the question to what extent foreign entry
has influenced bank interest margins, which is a commonly used measure of financial
intermediation costs offered by banks.
There is an established theoretical literature on the determinants of interest
margins initiated by the dealership model of Ho and Saunders (1981). This model
assumes that bank serves as a risk-averse dealer in the deposit and loan markets,
bearing the risk of refinancing due to the possible mismatch between the arrival of
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deposits and demand for loans. This mismatch is dealt with by the bank through
its activities in the money market, which creates a link between the optimal level of
the net interest margin set by the bank and the volatility of the money market rate
(the market risk). Some simplifying assumptions of the Ho and Saunders (1981)
model were later on relaxed by introducing heterogeneous bank products (Allen,
1988), credit risk (Angbanzo, 1997), and operating costs (Maudos and Fernandez de
Guevara, 2004) as important additional determinants of the bank interest margin.
The most recent development of the bank dealership model is provided by the model
of Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004), in which the set of theoretically moti-
vated determinants of the net interest margin includes market structure, operating
costs, managerial risk aversion, credit and market risks, and the size of bank opera-
tions.
A notable feature of the dealership model is that foreign ownership is not consid-
ered to be a determinant of interest margins. This is in sharp contrast to a different
stream of theoretical literature, which underscores the problem of asymmetric in-
formation between entrant (foreign) and incumbent (domestic) banks that might
influence the margin. Foreign banks have better screening technologies to identify
good borrowers based on hard information, while domestic banks possess superior
soft information (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). Differences in information dis-
tribution may result in a cream-skimming caused by foreign entry: in equilibrium
foreign banks would focus on providing services to less risky and large borrowers,
while domestic banks would concentrate their lending to more opaque and small
firms (Sengupta, 2007).1
Generally speaking, foreign entry can influence banks in host countries through
1Depending on the relative strength of the two opposite effects, the host countries can even
experience a decline in total lending following foreign bank entry, which has been empirically
documented in some less developed countries (Detragiache et al., 2008).
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various direct and indirect channels (Lehner and Schnitzer, 2008). One possible
channel is spillover effects from foreign to domestic banks in terms of better screening
facilities, technology utilization, and transfer of know-how. These indirect benefits
from increased foreign bank participation should result in lower average unit costs
associated with the financial intermediation process, reflected in lower equilibrium
margins. Another possible channel is the increase in competition due to opening up
of the banking market for foreign competitors. The mode of foreign entry (acquisition
versus greenfield investment) has important implications in this respect. While
greenfield investments increase the number of banks in the economy, entry through
foreign acquisition only affects ownership distribution of existing banks and does not
influence the total number of banks. Therefore, theoretically, the entry via foreign
greenfield investments should result in more competition than the entry via foreign
acquisition.2 In addition, the advantage of acquisition over greenfield entry is that
the foreign bank acquires information about the quality of incumbent borrowers
using the credit information inherited from the target bank. The average quality
of incumbent borrowers may influence the lending rate demanded by the acquired
banks for extending new loans, giving rise to the portfolio composition effect (Claeys
and Hainz, 2007).
Surprisingly, this apparent contradiction between the predictions of the dealer-
ship model and the other stream of theoretical literature has not been examined in
previous empirical studies analyzing the impact of foreign bank participation on in-
terest margins. Most of these studies took an ad hoc approach by analyzing various
determinants that are likely to affect bank interest margins (some of which partially
overlap with the theoretically motivated determinants of the dealership model). The
2Although in theory the number of banks and market concentration are considered to be im-
portant determinants of the level of competition, empirical studies do not find support for this
argumentation (Claessens and Laeven, 2004).
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impact of foreign ownership is commonly estimated by introducing a dummy vari-
able for foreign-owned banks (direct effect due to the magnitude of margins set by
foreign banks) and/or a country-wide measure of foreign bank participation, such as
the market share of foreign-owned banks (indirect effect due to spillovers).
Based on this approach, the empirical literature provides mixed evidence on the
impact of foreign bank participation on interest margins in emerging economies.
Among cross-country studies, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) found that for-
eign bank participation had a positive effect on interest margins in a worldwide
sample of 80 countries during 1988-1995. Schwaiger and Liebeg (2008) came to a
similar conclusion using a sample of 11 FSEs during 2000-2005. In contrast, the im-
pact of foreign entry was found to be negative in 5 Latin American countries during
1995-2000 (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004), in 11 FSEs during 1993-1999 (Drakos,
2003), and in 13 FSEs during 1994-2001 (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008).3 The
evidence is also mixed in single-county studies: Dabla-Norris and Floerkmeier (2007)
did not find any significant association between foreign ownership and interest mar-
gins in Armenia, whereas Denizer (2000) and Barajas et al. (2000) found that foreign
entry has driven down interest margins in Turkey and Colombia, respectively. All
in all, due to the absence of a unified theoretical framework and inconclusive empir-
ical evidence, the overall impact of foreign bank participation on interest margins
remains unclear.
The aim of this chapter is to fill this gap in the literature by re-examining the
empirical relationship between foreign bank participation and interest margins using
a more formal approach. Unlike most of the previous studies, we try to account for
theoretically motivated determinants of (the most advanced version of) the dealer-
3 In Martinez Peria and Mody (2004), the decrease is largely attributed to the participation of
greenfield foreign banks, whereas indirect effects due to foreign bank participation were found to
play a crucial role in Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008).
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ship model by Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) and the other stream of
literature theorizing on the impact of foreign bank participation on interest margins.
Careful analysis of the later literature suggests that most of the channels through
which foreign bank participation is expected to influence the margins are already ac-
counted for by the dealership model. For instance, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004)
argue that one of the channels through which increased foreign bank participation
can affect the margins is its impact on the cost of operations. However, the em-
pirical specification inspired by the dealership model already includes this variable
among interest margin determinants. Similarly, Bonin et al. (2005) and Lehner and
Schnitzer (2008) argue that foreign banks are able to charge lower margins due to
their superior efficiency. However, cost efficiency is taken into account by the deal-
ership model as determinant of the margins, too. Lastly, Claeys and Hainz (2007)
hypothesize that the possible negative impact of foreign bank participation may be
due to the portfolio effect, since foreign banks tend to be largely involved in financing
relatively safer clients. The dealership model, however, also considers the riskiness
of bank’s portfolio as an important factor influencing margins.
As a result, we conclude that there is no particular reason to expect that foreign
bank participation affects bank interest margins after the theoretically motivated
determinants of the dealership model are fully taken into account in the empirical
specification. Our empirical analysis supports this conclusion, as we find that after
controlling for the theoretically motivated determinants described in the dealership
model, various indicators of foreign bank participation (such as dummy variables
for greenfield and acquired foreign banks, a country-wide measure of foreign bank
participation) do not elicit a significant impact on interest margins. Intuitively, this
result suggests that both direct and indirect channels, through which the impact
of foreign bank participation on margins is expected to materialize (e.g., market
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structure), are fully accounted for by the dealership model. Our findings call for
re-examination of some of the previous studies, in which foreign bank participation
was found to have a significant own impact on interest margins.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes the
empirical methodology and data. Section 6.3 presents the estimation results and
their discussion. The last section concludes.
6.2 Methodology and Data
6.2.1 Empirical model
We estimate the dealership model using a fixed effect estimator to capture unob-
served heterogeneity at the individual bank level. The Maudos and Fernandez de
Guevara (2004) model is taken as a baseline specification, which we augment by in-
troducing two measures of foreign participation at the individual bank-level (foreign
greenfield banks and banks that entered through cross-border acquisitions) and one
measure at the country level (market share of foreign banks). We test the robust-
ness of our results regarding the impact of foreign participation by adding several
macroeconomic variables.
The general specification takes the following form:









+ λ1 ∗ DGF + λ2 ∗ DA + λ3 ∗ ForeignSharejt +Macrojt + DYEAR + εijt
where i, j, and t indices stand for bank, country, and time, respectively, Margin
is the interest margin, Theoretical and Environmental are vectors of bank-specific
(pure margin determinants) and environmental variables as defined in Maudos and
Fernandez de Guevara (2004), DGF is a dummy variable for greenfield foreign banks,
DA is a dummy variable for acquired foreign banks, ForeignShare is a percentage of
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banking system assets in the country controlled by the foreign-owned banks, Macro
is a set of macroeconomic control variables, and εijt is an i.i.d. random error. The
individual bank heterogeneity is captured by the fixed effects intercept term αi and
the time-specific variation is captured by a vector of time dummies DYEAR.
Table 6.1 provides a description of all variables and their sources. The net interest
margin is measured as the ratio of the net interest income over total earning assets.
We use the following pure margin determinants in our estimations (see Maudos and
Fernandez de Guevara, 2004). Market structure is captured by the Herfindahl index
measured as the sum of squares of individual bank market shares for each country.4
Operating costs are measured as a ratio of operating expenses to total assets. Risk
aversion is proxied by the equity-to-total assets ratio, implying higher risk aversion
for banks having higher ratios. Market risk is captured by the standard deviation
of monthly interbank money market rates.5 Credit risk is measured by the ratio
of loan loss provisions to net loans.6 The interaction of market and credit risk is
controlled for by introducing the interaction term of the above two risk measures
into the specification. The size of operations is captured by the logarithm of net
loans.
Furthermore, we control for environmental factors influencing interest margins
using three variables. Implicit interest payments are measured by the ratio of oper-
ating expenses net of non-interest revenues to total assets. Higher implicit interest
payments should be compensated by an increase in interest margins. Opportunity
costs of bank reserves are measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. More
4Total assets are used as a measure of banking activity.
5 In the absence of money market rates for some of the FSEs, the government T-Bill rates are used
as a measure of market rates.
6Due to a large amount of missing data, we cannot proxy credit risk by the ratio of non-performing
loans to total assets. Although a second best option, our measure of credit risk is still an improve-
ment compared to the ratio of loans to total assets used by Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara
(2004).
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liquid banks are expected to have higher margins in order to compensate for oppor-
tunity costs of holding extra liquidity. Finally, the managerial quality is proxied by
the cost-to-income ratio. Banks having a more qualified management are expected
to decrease interest margins due to lower cost-to-income ratio.
The model with the aforementioned theoretically-motivated and environmental
variables is based on the specification used in Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara
(2004), in which there is no role for the impact of the ownership structure on bank
interest margins. To test for the impact of foreign bank presence, we augment the
model by including proxies for foreign bank participation that are hypothesized to
affect the margin through a set of direct and indirect channels. By introducing the
DGF and DA dummies it is tested whether the average margins for foreign banks
(new and acquired) are significantly different from the average margin of the rest
of the banking institutions. By introducing ForeignShare variable, we test whether
there is a spillover effect arising from the presence of foreign banks in the banking
systems of host countries. That is, we test whether the overall level of foreign bank
participation in the banking system raises or lowers the margin after controlling for
individual bank ownership effects.
Given that the differences in margins across countries may be affected by the
macroeconomic environment in which banks operate, we control for the following
commonly used variables to check the robustness of our results. GDPPC is per
capita GDP in US dollars and GDPGR is the real GDP growth rate for each of the
countries capturing the influence of the level of economic development and economic
growth on interest margins, respectively. Inflation is the CPI-based inflation rate.7
7 In a separate set of regressions, we also included institutional characteristics of countries proxied
by the arithmetic average of EBRD indices covering small- and large-scale privatization, enterprise
reforms, price liberalization, forex and trade liberalization, competition policy, banking and non-
banking sector reforms, and reforms in infrastructure as an additional control variable. We obtained
insignificant coefficients, probably reflecting that the institutional characteristics of the CEECs in
our sample are relatively homogenous.
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In order to avoid simultaneity problems, we take lagged values of the theoretically-
motivated and environmental variables. A bias due to simultaneity can arise when
dependent and independent variables are contemporaneously related due to an ac-
counting identity or via a functional form. Using lagged values of independent
variables rules out the possibility of a simultaneous interaction, as the independent
variables become predetermined with respect to the dependent variable.8
6.2.2 Data
We combine information from different data sources for our analysis. The main data
source is the BankScope database of Bureau van Dĳk, from which we extract infor-
mation on individual bank balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. Our sample
is an unbalanced panel of 2,044 observations for 387 commercial, cooperative, and
savings banks from 11 CEECs for the period 1995-2006.9 Since BankScope provides
information only on current ownership of banks, we complement this data set by col-
lecting historical information on foreign ownership from different sources. First, we
use information on foreign-owned banks from the extended data set of De Haas and
Van Lelyveld (2006) employed in Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2008). The data set covers
the period 1995-2004 and categorizes foreign-owned banks into two groups: green-
field establishments and banks taken over as a result of a cross-border acquisition.
Next, for the remaining two years, we obtain a list of cross-border bank takeovers
from the Securities Data Company (SDC) mergers and acquisitions database pro-
duced by Thompson Financial. We identify 8 cross-border bank acquisition events
that led to a transfer of bank control from domestic to foreign ownership (at least 50
8We obtain qualitatively similar results with respect to the impact of foreign bank participation on
interest margins when the current values of the theoretically-motivated and environmental variables
are used in the estimations. Using the lagged variables only influences coefficient estimates of
theoretically motivated and environmental variables, while the impact of foreign bank participation
remains unaffected.
9Our sample comprises Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
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percent of capital) during 2005-2006. Finally, the aforementioned bank-level infor-
mation is complemented by country level information on the share of foreign-owned
banks in total banking assets from the EBRD Transition Report (EBRD, 2007). Our
macroeconomic variables - per capita GDP, GDP growth rates and consumer prices
- are taken from the World Development Indicators database (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.2 shows descriptive statistics of the net interest margin and its deter-
minants for the total sample, as well as for subsamples of domestic and foreign
banks. The average margin is about 4.2% but it has a large variation as shown by
its wide range. The magnitude of the margin is on average lower for the sample of
domestic banks, compared to foreign banks. This indicates that foreign banks are
charging a lower margin than domestic banks, suggesting a negative direct effect
of foreign bank participation on the margin. However, summary statistics of both
theoretically-motivated and environmental determinants of the margin suggest that
this variation can be explained by differences in variables influencing the margin.
For instance, foreign banks incur lower operating costs than domestic banks and the
credit portfolio of foreign banks is characterized by lower risks in comparison to the
credit portfolio of domestic banks.
6.3 Estimation Results
Table 6.3 presents estimation results for the reference and augmented dealership
models. All estimations are performed using the fixed effects estimator, which is
superior to the random effects estimator according to the Hausman test. We do
not present the coefficient estimates for time dummies to save space and keep the
discussion focused.
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6.3.1 The reference model
We start by fitting the model of Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) as ref-
erence specification. In this model, some of the theoretically-motivated variables
determining the margin have a significant impact and the expected sign. Interest
margins are higher for banks incurring greater operational expenses and more risk,
as well as for banks characterized by greater risk aversion. Similar to the finding of
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) for selected EU countries, we find that
interest margins increase with the size of operations, presumably reflecting compen-
sation for a possibility of larger losses per operation due to greater stakes. However,
contrary to Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004), we do not find a significant
impact for market concentration. This result might imply that in CEECs, the impact
of bank-specific characteristics outweighs the importance of the market structure.
Although the individual impact of market and credit risks come out insignificant,
their interaction term has a negative significant impact on the margin. This sug-
gests that the impact of the credit risk on the margins is amplified by the level of
the market risk, and vice versa. The negative sign is in contrast to the theoretical
expectation and suggests that CEECs banks are unable to value their risks properly.
For the environmental variables, we find a negative association between implicit
interest payments and margins. Banks holding greater liquid reserves compensate
their alternative costs by setting higher margins. Likewise, the cost-to-income ratio
has a significantly positive impact, reflecting that more cost inefficient banks charge
higher margins.
6.3.2 The impact of foreign bank participation
In order to evaluate the indirect impact of foreign bank participation on interest mar-
gins, in specification (II) we include the market share of foreign banks as additional
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explanatory variable.10 Our estimations do not support the hypothesis that foreign
bank participation has significant spill-over effects, when theoretically-motivated and
environmental variables are controlled for.
Specification (III) tests for the direct impact of foreign bank participation on
interest margins. The dummy variable for foreign-owned banks is not significant,
implying no significant own effect above the theoretically-motivated and environ-
mental determinants. Since theoretical models of foreign bank entry underscore the
importance of the mode of entry, in specifications (IV) and (V) we split the foreign
ownership dummy variable into two components: a dummy variable for greenfield
foreign banks and a dummy variable for acquired foreign banks. Our estimations
suggest that different modes of entry do not significantly influence interest margins,
after controlling for the impact of the theoretically-motivated and environmental de-
terminants. The impact remains insignificant when both dummy variables enter the
specification simultaneously (column VI) and together with the measure of indirect
impact of foreign bank participation (column VII).
Finally, in specification (VIII) we control for the impact of macroeconomic vari-
ables as additional explanatory variables influencing the margin. This does not
change our conclusion regarding the insignificant direct and indirect impact of for-
eign bank participation on the interest margin. We find that the margin is lower in
relatively more developed countries (negative and significant coefficient of per capita
GDP), while the impact of economic growth is insignificant. The margins increase
with the level of inflation, probably reflecting additional price uncertainty risk. It is
also important to note that introducing the macroeconomic variables wipes out the
impact of the market and credit risks interaction dummy, while the direct impact of
the market risk variable becomes significant.
10This variable was also used as a measure of spill-over effects from foreign bank participation to
margins in Latin American economies by Martinez Peria and Mody (2004).
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6.3.3 Economic significance
So far, we have focused on statistical significance only. In this section, we analyze
the economic relevance of the determinants of interest margins. Table 6.4 presents
the economic impact of interest margin determinants, measured as a response of
the interest margin in percentages to a one percentage change in its determinants
based on specification (VIII). The results suggest that among the theoretically-
motivated determinants, the most substantive impact comes from the size of banking
operations (1.25 percentage points) and the size of operating costs (0.25 percentage
points). Among the environmental variables, the economic impact of implicit interest
payments (0.11 percentage points) and cost inefficiency (0.09 percentage points)
are comparable in size. Finally, among the macroeconomic variables, the strongest
impact comes from the level of economic development of the country measured by
the per capita GDP (-9.6 percentage points).
The analysis of the relative impact of these variables suggests that the insignif-
icant impact of the foreign participation may be explained by the fact that all the
channels through which foreign participation may affect margins are already ac-
counted for in the dealership model. The insignificant own impact of foreign bank
participation calls for reassessment of previous findings on the impact of foreign
bank participation on interest margins.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter has re-examined the impact of foreign bank participation on interest
margins using the recent sharp increase of foreign bank presence in CEECs as a lab-
oratory experiment. We start by observing that the dealership model widely used
in empirical work to provide a quantitative assessment of factors driving the margin
122 Chapter 6
does not allow for the impact of foreign bank participation to be explicitly tested.
The mechanisms through which foreign bank participation may influence bank be-
havior and ultimately the margin are analyzed by other models in a framework
different from the dealership model. However, the majority of these mechanisms,
like market concentration, riskiness of bank portfolio, and operational costs, are
already taken into account by the margin determinants inspired by the dealership
model. This raises the question of whether the foreign bank participation has its
own direct and/or indirect impact on interest margins.
Previous empirical studies that addressed this question have produced mixed
results. Most of the studies report a negative effect, suggesting that foreign par-
ticipation helps to decrease the margin due to spillover effects and portfolio mix of
foreign banks (see, for example, Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004), while others did
not find any significant impact, or even reported a positive impact (see, for example,
Schwaiger and Liebeg, 2008). The mixed results in these studies can be explained
by differences in the coverage of theoretical determinants inspired by the dealership
model.
Using data on domestic and foreign-owned banks in 11 CEECs, we show that
after fully accounting for all interest margin determinants inspired by the dealership
model, foreign bank participation does not have any significant impact on interest
margins in CEECs. The impact remains insignificant when we differentiate between
proxies for indirect (foreign bank market share) and direct (dummy variables for
greenfield and acquired foreign banks) effects of foreign bank presence. We explain
this finding by the fact that the variables inspired by the dealership model already
account for the main mechanisms through which the impact of foreign bank partic-
ipation on the margins may be materialized. Our results call for a reassessment of
results reported in some of the previous studies, which suggest a direct impact of
foreign bank participation.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Net interest margin 0.045 0.040 0.024 0.002 0.196
Market concentration 0.158 0.129 0.070 0.084 0.473
Operating costs 0.062 0.054 0.034 0.007 0.272
Risk aversion 0.133 0.111 0.088 0.012 0.658
Market risk 0.024 0.013 0.038 0.001 0.296
Credit risk 0.036 0.019 0.052 0.000 0.574
Size of operations 11.739 11.653 1.639 7.436 15.565
Implicit interest payments -0.014 -0.013 0.026 -0.125 0.123
Opportunity costs of bank re-
serves
0.052 0.034 0.050 0.000 0.280
Cost inefficiency 0.851 0.804 0.372 0.160 3.999
Foreign banks
Net interest margin 0.037 0.031 0.026 0.003 0.185
Market concentration 0.146 0.123 0.069 0.084 0.473
Operating costs 0.048 0.039 0.031 0.010 0.237
Risk aversion 0.123 0.101 0.082 0.021 0.612
Market risk 0.016 0.009 0.028 0.001 0.296
Credit risk 0.018 0.010 0.030 0.000 0.278
Size of operations 12.439 12.500 1.557 7.787 15.560
Implicit interest payments -0.011 -0.012 0.020 -0.112 0.100
Opportunity costs of bank re-
serves
0.040 0.025 0.045 0.000 0.264
Cost inefficiency 0.823 0.773 0.297 0.156 2.954
Total sample
Net interest margin 0.042 0.036 0.025 0.002 0.196
Market concentration 0.154 0.128 0.070 0.084 0.473
Operating costs 0.057 0.049 0.034 0.007 0.272
Risk aversion 0.130 0.106 0.086 0.012 0.658
Market risk 0.021 0.011 0.035 0.001 0.296
Credit risk 0.030 0.015 0.046 0.000 0.574
Size of operations 11.987 11.968 1.644 7.436 15.565
Implicit interest payments -0.013 -0.012 0.024 -0.125 0.123
Opportunity costs of bank re-
serves
0.048 0.031 0.049 0.000 0.280
Cost inefficiency 0.841 0.793 0.347 0.156 3.999
Notes: all variables are measured in thousands of US dollars and deflated by the consumer price index, using 1995 as a
reference year. Each variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, to confront the influence of outliers and reporting
mistakes.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.4. Economic significance of interest margin determinants
Coefficient P-value
Market concentration 0.0309 0.1800
Operating costs 0.2537 0.0000
Risk aversion 0.0751 0.0030
Market risk -0.0351 0.0020
Credit risk -0.0032 0.6740
Interaction term (Market risk*Credit risk) -0.0042 0.1220
Size of operations 1.2490 0.0000
Implicit interest payments 0.1061 0.0000
Liquidity 0.0176 0.1740
Cost inefficiency 0.0931 0.0140
Market share of foreign banks -0.0001 0.9990
Foreign greenfield bank dummy 0.0000 0.9190
Foreign acquired bank dummy 0.0090 0.2260
GDP per capita (US dollars) -9.5853 0.0000
Real GDP growth rate 0.0049 0.8480
Inflation (consumer prices) 0.1090 0.0000
Notes: reported are economic significance results from specification (VII) in Table 6.3. The coefficients





During the last two decades, the financial landscape around the world has under-
gone dramatic changes following a wave of financial liberalization, globalization,
and removal of restrictions on cross-border banking activities. Motivated by these
developments in international banking, this thesis analyzes the impact of foreign
bank participation on banking systems in host countries. In particular, the thesis
addresses the following research questions:
• What motivates banks to expand their activities internationally?
• What is the impact of foreign bank participation on the performance and
competition of banking systems in host countries?
• Does the mode of foreign entry matter for the post-entry performance of banks?
• How does increased foreign bank participation affect the costs of financial
intermediation?
The key challenge in analyzing these research questions is that the theoretical studies
provide contrasting predictions regarding the ultimate impact of foreign bank par-
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ticipation on banking systems in host countries. Empirical investigations are also
plagued with a number of difficulties, such as scarcity of adequate data, different
macroeconomic and institutional characteristics of host countries, sample-selection
issues related to the decision of banks to go abroad. This thesis tries to tackle these
empirical challenges by: (i) using bank-level data on FSEs that have experienced a
substantial increase of foreign bank participation during the last two decades, (ii)
applying innovative empirical methodologies to confront difficulties associated with
the empirical assessment of the impact of foreign bank participation.
Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of foreign bank participation on bank performance,
focusing on the impact of sample-selection on the decision of foreign banks to go
abroad. In particular, the chapter examines whether the positive impact of foreign
ownership on the efficiency of banks in FSEs documented in previous studies (Bonin
et al., 2005, Fries and Taci, 2005, Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007) may be biased
due to the cream-skimming effect.1 Using a two-step approach (Heckman, 1979),
we come up with new evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to acquire good
performing banks when expanding abroad. We further show that after controlling for
the sample selection, the positive impact of foreign ownership on bank performance
documented in previous studies vanishes. In addition, our results suggest that those
FSEs that have attracted more foreign direct investment into their banking sectors
are characterized by a lower level of bank efficiency. These findings underscore the
importance of exercising care in drawing conclusions regarding the impact of foreign
ownership on bank performance in the presence of sample selection problems.
Chapter 3 provides further evidence on the motives driving banks to expand their
activities internationally. We build on the previous literature that distinguishes be-
1The cream-skimming effect suggests that foreign banks select best performing banks for ac-
quisition, which complicates the empirical analysis of the impact of foreign ownership on bank
performance due to the sample selection problem.
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tween the efficiency versus market power hypotheses2 as motives for foreign expan-
sion (Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2007) and hypothesize that the relative strength
of these hypotheses may vary depending on the institutional environment in host
countries (EBRD, 2006; Lensink et al., 2008). Using a novel multilevel mixed-effect
logistic regression framework, we find support for the market power hypothesis in
relatively less advanced FSEs in terms of their economic development and institu-
tional background. This finding is in line with previous evidence of Lanine and
Vander Vennet (2007). However, we also show support for the efficiency hypothesis,
which holds for relatively more advanced FSEs. Our findings highlight the impor-
tance of macroeconomic heterogeneity in FSEs and its relevance for the decision of
foreign banks to go abroad.
The discussion of the implications of heterogeneous economic environments in
which banks operate for the assessment of their performance is continued in Chapter
4. We start our analysis by noticing that previous studies analyzing performance of
banks in FSEs based on the efficiency frontier framework impose a single technology
regime in banking. One of the consequences of this restrictive assumption is that
in the presence of multiple technology regimes, the obtained inefficiency estimates
will be biased (Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004). Moreover, the technology regimes in
transition banking are very likely to be affected by notable differences in macroeco-
nomic environments of these countries. Using a novel latent class stochastic frontier
methodology, we relax the single-frontier assumption of previous studies and al-
low for multiple technology regimes in transition banking. Our estimations suggest
that transition banking is characterized by three distinct technology regimes. These
technology regimes differ not only in terms of relative performance, technological
2The efficiency hypothesis suggests that foreign banks enter host countries with the aim of ex-
tracting revenues as a result of upgrading performance of target banks. In contrast, the market
power hypothesis suggests that the main motivation for foreign entry is acquisition of large local
banks that would allow to exercise market power and extract monopolistic rents.
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progress, and returns to scale, but also in terms of the impact of foreign ownership
on bank efficiency. More specifically, we find that foreign entry improves efficiency of
banks located in FSEs characterized by better economic development prospects and
institutional background, while the impact of foreign ownership on the efficiency of
banks in less developed FSEs is ambiguous. This result confirms our previous finding
on the importance of accounting for the macroeconomic environment in evaluating
the impact of foreign bank participation.
Chapter 5 deals with another important aspect of opening the borders for for-
eign entry: its implications for the competitiveness in the domestic banking industry.
The novelty of our approach is that we take into account the impact of foreign en-
try on bank efficiency when assessing its implications for market competition. In
addition, we differentiate between two modes of foreign entry, foreign acquisitions
and greenfield establishments, when analyzing the impact of foreign entry on bank-
ing competition. This differentiation is important given different motives behind
these modes of entry: while greenfield investments are motivated by the follow the
client abroad considerations, cross-border acquisitions aim at establishing full scale
operations in FSEs. Our results suggest that foreign entry contributes to the com-
petitiveness in the banking industry only for the case of cross-border acquisitions,
while the impact of greenfield investments is insignificant. The latter finding can be
explained by the special relationships between foreign banks and their customers in
FSEs, which adds to the market power of greenfield foreign banks.
In Chapter 6 we investigate the impact of foreign bank participation on the
costs of financial intermediation in FSEs, proxied by net interest margins. The-
oretical studies on determinants of interest margins (the dealership model) do not
consider the role of bank ownership among the determinants (Ho and Saunders, 1981;
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004), while other theoretical studies outline
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various direct and indirect channels through which foreign ownership may matter
(Claeys and Hainz, 2007; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Lehner and Schnitzer,
2008). Comparative analysis of both types of theoretical studies reveals that the
main channels through which foreign ownership may matter for the cost of financing
are taken into account by the dealership model. Our empirical analysis supports this
hypothesis and suggests that after taking into account the theoretically motivated
determinants of interest margins discussed in the dealership model, the own impact
of foreign ownership is insignificant. This finding is in contrast to previous studies,
which did not take into account all theoretically motivated determinants and found
significant impact of foreign ownership dummies, interpreting those as own effects
of foreign ownership on the cost of financing.
7.2 Policy Implications
The analysis conducted in this thesis confirms the general expectations of policymak-
ers that increased foreign bank participation will have a positive impact on FSEs,
but with some caveats. First of all, the analysis shows that the impact of foreign
bank entry is not uniform across FSEs. On average, more developed FSEs with a
better record for policy reforms seem to have gained more from foreign bank partici-
pation than the others. Related to this, the causal relationship between foreign bank
participation and performance may have gone also in the opposite direction, namely
improvement of overall economic performance and positive prospects of EU member-
ship have attracted foreign banks to the advanced FSEs. Next, the mode of foreign
entry needs to be taken into account by the policymakers when formulating policies
encouraging the foreign bank entry. Different motivations behind these modes re-
sult in different post-entry performance of foreign banks and should be weighed by
policymakers with care. Finally, further efforts need to be undertaken to improve
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the competitive stance of transition banking systems. Although foreign entry im-
proves competition on the margin, it should not be treated as panacea of solving all
problems in the domestic banking markets. A substantial degree of market power is
still present in most FSEs’ banking sectors.
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Gedurende de laatste twee decennia is de financiële wereld drastisch veranderd als
gevolg van een golf van financiële liberalisaties en globalisatie in de banksector.
Tegen deze achtergrond wordt in dit proefschrift de invloed van de toetreding van
buitenlandse bank op het bancaire stelsel van gastlanden geanalyseerd. In dit proef-
schrift worden in het bĳzonder de volgende onderzoeksvragen behandeld:
• Wat brengt een bank ertoe om activiteiten in het buitenland op te zetten?
• Wat is de invloed van participatie van buitenlandse banken op de prestaties
van en de concurrentie binnen het bancaire systeem van het gastland?
• Is de wĳze van toetreding van invloed op de prestaties na toetreding?
• Hoe beïnvloedt toetreding van buitenlandse banken de kosten van financiële
bemiddeling?
Theoretische studies leveren tegenstrĳdige voorspellingen over de invloed van
toetreding van buitenlandse banken op het bancaire systeem van de gastlanden.
Empirisch onderzoek wordt bemoeilĳkt door schaarsheid van data en verschillen
in macro-economische en institutionele karakteristieken van de gastlanden waarmee
rekening dient te worden gehouden. Bovendien kunnen selectie invloeden die gerela-
teerd zĳn aan de keuze van een bank om internationaal te gaan opereren de resultaten
beïnvloeden. In dit proefschrift worden deze problemen aangepakt door: (i) Data
te gebruiken op bank niveau van banken uit voormalige socialistische economieën
(former socialists economies FSEs). Er is voor FSEs gekozen omdat deze groep
van landen te maken heeft gehad met een grote toename van buitenlandse bank
participatie gedurende de laatste twee decennia. (ii) Toepassing van innovatieve em-
pirische methoden die kunnen omgaan met de moeilĳkheden die het analyseren van
buitenlandse bank participatie met zich mee brengt.
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In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt onderzocht wat de invloed van toetreding van buitenlandse
banken is op de prestaties van banken. Dit hoofdstuk richt zich voornamelĳk op
de invloed van sampleselectie die ontstaat door de keuze van banken om naar het
buitenland te gaan. Specifiek wordt gekeken of de positieve invloed van buitenlands
eigendom op de efficiency, zoals beschreven in eerdere studies (Bonin et al., 2005,
Fries and Taci, 2005, Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007), verklaard kan worden door
het zogenoemde cream-skimming effect. Hiermee wordt bedoeld dat buitenlandse
banken alleen de best presterende binnenlandse banken overnemen.
In dit hoofdstuk maken we gebruik van een twee-staps procedure (Heckman,
1979) waarmee we laten zien dat buitenlandse banken voornamelĳk goed presterende
banken overnemen wanneer ze naar het buitenland gaan. Wanneer er gecontroleerd
wordt voor deze sampleselectie, is niet langer sprake van een positieve invloed van
buitenlandse banken op de prestaties van de bancaire sector zoals die in eerdere
studies werd gerapporteerd. Bovendien wĳzen de resultaten erop dat FSEs die meer
buitenlandse directe investeringen hebben aangetrokken een minder efficiënte bank
sector hebben.
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt nieuw bewĳs geleverd voor de motieven die een bank heeft
om zĳn activiteiten naar het buitenland uit te breiden. Wĳ bouwen op voorgaande
literatuur die onderscheid maakt tussen de efficiency en demarket power hypothesen
als motieven om buitenlandse banken over te nemen (Lanine and Vander Vennet,
2007) en veronderstellen dat de relatieve kracht van deze motieven afhankelĳk kan
zĳn van de institutionele omgeving in het gastland (EBRD, 2006; Lensink et al.,
2008). De efficiency hypothese veronderstelt dat buitenlandse banken die banken
kopen waarvan ze verwachten dat ze de efficiëntie kunnen verbeteren. De market
power hypothese veronderstelt dat banken juist banken kopen met veel marktmacht.
Met gebruikmaking van een recent ontwikkeld latente klasse logistische regressie
raamwerk, laten we zien dat demarket power hypothese opgaat voor FSEs die relatief
minder ontwikkeld zĳn in termen van inkomen en kwaliteit van hun instituties. Voor
de meer ontwikkelde FSEs vinden we echter bewĳs voor de efficiency hypothese.
Onze bevindingen benadrukken dat het belangrĳk is om rekening te houden met
heterogeniteit binnen FSEs bĳ het testen van de invloed toetreding van buitenlandse
banken.
De discussie over de invloed van heterogene economische omgevingen waarbinnen
banken opereren op het analyseren van hun prestaties, wordt voortgezet in Hoofdstuk
4. Eerdere studies die bankprestaties meten met behulp van een efficient frontier
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raamwerk veronderstellen dat de te bestuderen landen beschikken over dezelfde tech-
nologie. Een gevolg van deze nogal restrictieve veronderstelling is dat wanneer blĳkt
dat er verschillende technologieën zĳn, de verkregen efficiëntie scores gekleurd kun-
nen zĳn (Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004). Bovendien is het waarschĳnlĳk dat bank tech-
nologieën worden beïnvloed door de verschillen in de macro economische omgeving
van FSEs. Met behulp van een recent ontwikkeld latente klasse stochastic frontier
methodologie kan de assumptie dat alle landen beschikken over dezelfde technologie
worden versoepeld. Onze schattingen duiden erop dat bankieren in transitie lan-
den wordt gekarakteriseerd door drie verschillende technologieën. De technologieën
verschillen niet alleen in termen van relatieve prestaties, technologische vooruitgang
en schaalvoordelen, maar ook met betrekking tot de invloed van buitenlands eigen-
dom op de efficiëntie van een bank. Meer specifiek vinden we dat toetreding van
buitenlandse banken de efficiëntie van banken verbetert in landen die sinds kort
lid zĳn van de EU. Deze landen hebben betere economische vooruitzichten en een
sterkere institutionele achtergrond. De invloed van buitenlands eigendom op minder
ontwikkelde landen is ambigu. Deze resultaten onderbouwen de eerdere bevindingen
van het belang van de macro economische en institutionele omgeving als het gaat
om het evalueren van buitenlandse bank participatie.
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt gekeken wat de invloed van het openstellen van grenzen
is op de concurrentie binnen het binnenlandse bancaire systeem. Het vernieuwende
van onze aanpak is dat we rekening houden met de invloed van het toetreden van
buitenlandse banken bĳ het analyseren van de concurrentie binnen het bancaire sys-
teem. Bovendien maken we onderscheid tussen overnames en greenfield investments.
Dit onderscheid is belangrĳk omdat er voor de verschillende manieren van toetreding
mogelĳk verschillende motieven zĳn. Bĳ een greenfield is het waarschĳnlĳk dat de
bank zĳn klanten achterna gaat en slechts beperkte diensten aanbiedt, terwĳl bĳ een
overname het waarschĳnlĳk is dat de bank een breeds scala van diensten wil gaan
aanbieden. Onze resultaten duiden erop dat toetreding van buitenlandse banken
alleen bĳdraagt aan meer concurrentie in de bank sector wanneer er sprake is van
een overname. De invloed van greenfields op de concurrentie is niet significant.
In Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoeken we de invloed van buitenlandse banken op de kosten
voor financiële bemiddeling in FSEs, door te kĳken naar netto interest marges. The-
oretische studies over de determinanten van interest marges (’het dealership model’)
gaan ervan uit dat karakteristieken van de eigenaar van een bank hierin geen rol spe-
len (Ho and Saunders, 1981; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004). Andere stud-
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ies geven echter aan dat buitenlands eigendom via verschillende directe en indirecte
kanalen wel degelĳk van invloed kan zĳn op interest marges (Claeys and Hainz, 2007;
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Lehner and Schnitzer, 2008). Vergelĳkende analy-
ses van beide typen theoretische studies laten zien dat de hoofd kanalen waarmee
buitenlands eigendom van invloed is op de kosten van financiering meegenomen wor-
den in het dealership model. Onze empirische analyse ondersteunt deze hypothese
en laat zien dat wanneer rekening wordt gehouden met theoretisch gemotiveerde
determinanten, eigendom niet van invloed is op de interest marge. Deze bevinding
wĳkt af van eerdere studies die geen rekening houden met theoretisch gefundeerde
determinanten en alleen eigendom opnemen als determinant van interest marges. In
deze studies komt naar voren dat eigendom significant is.
Onze analyses bevestigen de verwachting van beleidsmakers dat een toename
van buitenlandse banken een positieve invloed heeft op FSEs, maar leiden ook tot
enige nuanceringen. Allereerst is de invloed van buitenlandse banken niet overal
hetzelfde. Gemiddeld genomen profiteren FSEs waar hervormingen zĳn doorgevoerd
meer van toetreding van buitenlandse banken dan FSEs waar deze hervormingen
nog onvoldoende zĳn doorgevoerd. Het is echter ook mogelĳk dat de causaliteit
omgekeerd is en dat banken voornamelĳk naar die landen zĳn gegaan die al meer
economisch ontwikkeld waren en zich richtten op toetreding tot de EU.
Vervolgens blĳkt dat beleidsmakers rekening moeten houden met de wĳze waarop
buitenlandse banken toetreden. De motieven die schuilgaan achter de manier van
toetreding resulteren in verschillende in prestaties na toetreding. Ten slotte moet er
extra inspanning geleverd worden om de concurrentie binnen het bancaire systeem
in de transitie landen te verbeteren. Hoewel toetreding van buitenlandse banken
leidt tot meer concurrentie, blĳkt in de meeste FSEs sprake te zĳn van marktmacht.
